must be protected and promoted." 9 Because the syllogism articulates "an attitude of respect for life which is at the same time human and Christian," the Congregation moves in the second and third sections to give backings for the premises, first on the basis of Scripture and tradition and then in terms of the "light of reason." Thus the first three sections of the Declaration provide a syllogism and the "Christian and human" backings for the premises, all directing the reader to the singular conclusion, "Divine law and natural reason, therefore, exclude all right to the direct killing of an innocent man." 10 The fourth section consists of replies to various objections which claim mitigating circumstances; it summarizes, "The damage to moral values (that results from abortion) is always a greater evil for the common good than any disadvantage in the economic or demographic order."
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It is only after the syllogism is stated and defended that the Declaration proceeds to attend to broader economic, political, and cultural issues. These are simply the implications of an already settled specific determination. The force of the replies to the objections in the fourth section is to deny that any wider consideration can alter the line of deduction. It is further noteworthy that when the document does address the implications of the syllogism in the fifth section, the first and primary emphasis is on the feasibility and necessity of laws against the specific act of abortion. This indicates that here the deductive reasoning is linked with a juridical understanding of the moral life.
One paragraph does call for policies to help families, unmarried mothers, and children, but the idea remains undeveloped and is immediately followed in the next paragraph by a call to heroism in "following one's conscience in obedience to the law of God" on the question of taking the life of the embryo and fetus. In the penultimate paragraph, the document begins again to broach the wider social context. It calls for all persons, groups and institutions, not just the state, to do what is possible for families, mothers, and children. "This is the law of charity, of which the first preoccupation must be the establishment of justice. One can never approve of abortion; but it is above all necessary to combat its causes." It would be a misreading, then, to interpret the Declaration as not making a linkage at all between abortion and the care of children. The point is more qualified: the exclusive use of the deductive model of moral reasoning on abortion means that the care of children, as an implication following from the conclusion of a syllogism concerned with determining the morality of taking the life of the fetus, enters the argument only in a brief fashion at the end of the treatment and remains undeveloped. Therefore, the deductive method creates a pastoral asymmetry. It is not incidental, then, that the call for laws prohibiting taking the life of the fetus comes first and receives a much more sustained treatment in the final section of the document than the urging for help for families, mothers, and children.
Thus, analysis of the Declaration highlights the fact that although abortion is often considered to be a social issue, the mode of reasoning utilized to address it is one which discourages, except as an indirect implication, reflection on a social context wider than legal prohibitions. The question arises as to how we are to overcome the methodological split between social and sexual teachings. Doing so is the first step in adequately addressing the relationship between abortion and the care of children. As indicated at the outset, both the methodological and substantive aspects of this problem have been an ongoing concern of Cardinal Bernardin. The consistent ethic of life is his constructive proposal, and it has been taken up in the documents of the National Conference of Catholic Bishops.
SEPARATE BUT RELATED LIFE ISSUES
Cardinal Bernardin's consistent ethic of life grew out of an effort to draw upon the public success of "The Challenge of Peace" in order to focus attention on and gain consensus around other issues, particularly abortion. 13 The ethic not only arises out of official teaching; it feeds back into it as well. When the bishops revised their Pastoral Plan for Pro-Life Activities of 1975 in their Reaffirmation of 1985, they explicitly adopted the language and the vision of the consistent ethic of life.
14 Bernardin's aim, and that of the pastoral plan, is to demonstrate that abortion is not the only "pro-life" issue in need of redress. The double purpose of the consistent ethic thus comes to light. It is at once an attempt to make the Catholic abortion argument plausible to a hesitant if not skeptical public and an effort to convince pro-life advo- 13 Bernardin, "A Consistent Ethic of Life: An American-Catholic Dialogue," in Consistent Ethic 4-5 [hereafter: "American-Catholic Dialogue"].
14 Bernardin, "Address at Seattle," in Consistent Ethic 77; see in the same volume his "Address: Consistent Ethic of Life Conference" 88.
cates that their range of concern needs to extend beyond the problem of taking the life of the fetus.
The starting point of the consistent ethic is Bernardin's reading of the "signs of the times" that there are multiple threats to the human person. The increasing destructiveness of all forms of warfare, the developing consensus for capital punishment, the emergence of calls for euthanasia, the rise in the incidence of abortion since Roe v. Wade, and the continuation of social and economic injustice all jeopardize the dignity of the human person.
15 "In the face of the multiple threats in our time, spanning every phase of our existence, it is necessary to develop a moral vision which can address these several challenges in a coherent and comprehensive fashion." 16 The core concept in this moral vision is that of the dignity of the human person. 17 Because of this dignity, we owe respect to human life. 18 Behind the dignity of the human person and the attitude of respect lies the theological claim that the person is sacred. 19 Backing the claim that life is sacred is the doctrine of the imago Dei.
20
Adequate moral vision fosters the disposition, or what Bernardin calls an "attitude," of respect for human life in all of its manifestations. 21 Given proper vision and attitude, one can discern that there is a link between the various life issues. The connection between issues is therefore less the result of detailed empirical substantiation than of a deep, informed moral intuition. Bernardin's claim is bold: "We desperately need an attitude or climate in society which will sustain a comprehensive, consistent defense and promotion of life."
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The phrase "comprehensive and consistent defense and promotion of life" is crucial. The distinction between protection and promotion has been used to justify sharply divergent treatment of different issues. Bernardin's inclusion of both types of responses under the rubric of life 15 "After Webster" 743; "Religion and Politics" 324-25. 16 is an attempt to overcome the perceived imbalance in the Church's response to the multiple threats to the human person. 23 While one type of issue is a matter of the "right to life," the other concerns the "quality of life," but the two are related. 24 In particular, at several points Bernardin is adamant in insisting upon the link between abortion, which pertains to protecting the fetus, and support for women and children, an issue of the promotion of human life.
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Bernardin's insistence that issues of promotion and protection be brought under the general rubric of a moral vision of life and an attitude of respect appears to have overcome the pastoral and political imbalance in the traditional response to these two types of issues. He is as impassioned about the care of children as he is about the prohibition against taking the life of the fetus. However, this consistency is quite fragile. This is because between the general level of ocular metaphors and the dispositions they require, on the one hand, and specific policy considerations, on the other, is the intervening level of moral methodology. The consistent ethic of life retains, in somewhat modified form, the methodological split that marks official teaching.
The split is evident precisely in the assignment of issues to the categories of "right to life" and "quality of life." 26 with the former requiring protection and the latter promotion or enhancement. 27 On the issues that require the protection of human life, including abortion, the logic is deductive. Bernardin invokes the principle, "no direct killing of innocents," as the major premise. It serves as a further specification of the right to life. The key question in the reasoning is whether the practice in question fits under the description of the killing of an innocent human person and so qualifies as the minor premise. If it does, then its moral and legal prohibition directly follows. In Bernardin's words, the "fundamental challenge" is in "deciding who fits in the circle of the legally protected human community." The difficulty is not in the use of the deductive approach per se, but in its relation to the reasoning on other issues. 29 Because the rubric of life is so general, the link between abortion and the care of children is loose; because Bernardin continues the methodological dichotomy, whatever connection is made is fragile. The danger is minimally that abortion, approached only within the deductive framework, will gain ascendancy again as the most important issue. If this occurs with any force and frequency, the separate but related issues of abortion and the care of children will decouple once more. If this occurs, then the two will no longer be equal issues under the rubric of "life." The care of children will become simply an indirect implication rather than a concern from the start.
The fragility of the connection between abortion and the care of children is evident in an exchange with John Finnis. When Finnis argues that a candidate's position on abortion can serve as a litmus test for fitness for office, Bernardin's reply does not flow from the intrinsic structure of the consistent ethic, but from a concern about relevance in the public debate.
To insist that the only person a Catholic may vote for must pass a litmus test based on how a person has or presumably would vote on a particular issue apart from an evaluation of the overall political process and the position of the candidate on other pro-life issues could eliminate us as a political reality in our society. What we must find is a way, without compromising our fundamental convictions and, in particular, our commitment to the life of the unborn, that we can credibly remain as participants in the development and transformation of public policy.
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This last line suggests that the driving force of the consistent ethic is to make the Catholic position on abortion plausible to a hesitant and even skeptical American public. 31 Now public plausibility is indeed a legitimate concern. But the point here is that the consistency of the 29 Both documents have sections on pastoral care that specifically focus on care for women and children and precede the sections on legislative efforts to legally prohibit abortion. This in itself is significant when compared to the ordering in the Declaration of the CDF, where such care receives brief mention only after there is extended treatment on the need for laws prohibiting abortion. However, the two NCCB pastoral plans differ significantly from each other in tone in key passages. Here is where the influence of the consistent ethic is most evident. The Reaffirmation picks up the theme that a broad range of issues are related under the general rubric of "life," each one "touching on the dignity" of the person. 39 As with the consistent ethic articulated in Bernardin's speeches, the grouping of issues on the general level leads to a greater evenhandedness on the level of specifics. Two policy 37 "After Webster" 746. 38 After speaking about the need to focus on the central role of the issue of abortion, the bishops go on to state, 'This focus and the Church's firm commitment to consistent ethic of life complement each other" (A Reaffirmation nos. 8-9; see also nos. 10-12,49). Bernardin acknowledges the role of the consistent ethic in shaping the document ("Address at Seattle" 77).
It is noteworthy that when
39 A Reaffirmation no. 10. changes are evident in moving from the original Pastoral Plan to the Reaffirmation. First, the original Plan focuses on critical scrutiny of public officials, while the Reaffirmation has a more dialogical emphasis. 40 Second, the 1975 document places virtually exclusive emphasis on a constitutional amendment as the policy objective. The later document recognizes that there may be a plurality of legitimate policy options. 41 However, the methodological split in the consistent ethic is also evident in the Reaffirmation. The deductive approach to abortion is displayed in the argument that among the life issues "abortion necessarily plays a central role," because it involves a "direct attack on innocent life." 42 Again, "no direct killing of innocents" is the major premise of the syllogism. That aiding and joining women in the care of children is once more an indirect implication of the deduced conclusion rather than an issue that is present from the start is evident in the statement of the pastoral care section that material assistance for women does not extend beyond "the first year of life." 43 The focus is on assuring that life is sustained through the limited period of time from the onset of pregnancy through one year. While the consistent ethic does stress the problem of economic justice in its overall schema, it is clear that extended economic care-considered in the consistent ethic as a related but separate issue from that of abortion-has largely decoupled from the problem of abortion when the pro-life plan moves to pastoral objectives.
Because the pastoral focus is only on the first year of life, it obscures the enormity of what is required in the care of children. This results in a pastoral imbalance. The calls for legal prohibitions on abortion have an urgency that is lacking in the prescriptions for aiding women. The language used to describe what is required legally is that of "rever- 40 The original document, stressing scrutiny of officeholders, lists among its objectives, 'To convince elected officials that 'the abortion issue" will not go away and that their position on it will be subject to continuing public scrutiny," and "To maintain an informational file on the pro-life position of every elected official and potential candidate" (nos. 49, 54). The Reaffirmation, emphasizing more of a dialogical approach, softens the wording so that the objective is that of "helping pro-life citizens to organize more effectively, so that their view will be heard and taken into account by party officials and elected representatives" (no. 211). 41 For instance, an objective for parish pro-life committees in the original 1975 document stated, "Through ongoing public information programs, (to) generate public awareness of the continuing effort to obtain a constitutional amendment" (no. 39). The 1985 document modifies this to read "to foster public awareness of the need for a constitutional amendment and other laws and policies to restore legal protection for the unborn" (no. 44c).
42 A Reaffirmation no. 8. ** Ibid. no. 29.
sal." 44 The cultural momentum must be turned around with all due speed. However, aiding and joining women in the care of children requires only an "extension" of efforts already in place. 46 The The Influence of "The Challenge of Peace" The moral approach and language of response and responsibility is comparatively new. 48 In Catholic social teaching, it had its inauguration with Gaudium et spes. 49 The American Catholic bishops explicitly base their thinking in "The Challenge of Peace" on the model of Gaudium et spes. 50 Because the peace pastoral exhibits the response approach not only on the level of generality, but also on that of particulars, it serves as a more complete example and is better for initial illustration than either Gaudium et spes or "Putting Children and Families First." What we will find is that "Putting Children and Families First" subsumes under the response approach the deductive and deontological thought that keys around the principle "no direct killing of innocents" on abortion, in precisely the way that "The Challenge of Peace" treats the same principle with regard to noncombatant immunity.
The overarching language of "The Challenge of Peace" is that of "promise," or "challenge," and "response." This is first indicated in the subtitle of the letter, "God's Promise and Our Response." The bishops unpack the meaning of this phrase when they later state, "Peace and war must always be seen in light of God's intervention in human affairs and our response to that intervention. Both are elements within the ongoing revelation of God's will for creation." 51 God's intervention is simultaneously promise and challenge, and the task of the community is to respond accordingly. Thus the bishops frame the document by interpreting the nature of responsiveness in biblical terms in the first major section (nos. 27-55), and by calling the faithful to respond through their particular vocations in the last section, which is aptly titled "Pastoral Challenge and Response" (nos. 274-329). Taken together, these two sections form an inclusio around the moral reasoning and policy choices that form the middle parts of the letter.
In the paragraphs that open the document, the bishops initiate their moral reflection by describing the realities of the nuclear situation: "The crisis of which we speak arises from this fact: nuclear war threatens the existence of our planet; this is a more menacing threat than 48 After the bishops give their opening statement of "what is going on," they provide, in the first major section, a broad biblical perspective within which to interpret the nuclear debate. Here it is important to note that the bishops insist that theological language is not directly translatable into moral principles. Referring to "certain key moral principles," the bishops state that "these norms do not exhaust the gospel vision." 54 The language of "vision" and "image" shapes the theological discourse, evidencing the fact that such metaphors do not provide us with principles, but instead construe the context within which our use of principles is appropriate. In so doing, the biblically informed theological discourse provides, in the bishops' words, "an urgent direction" for the community's response. 55 All moral methodologies and principles are subsumed under the general obligation to respond to the promise and challenge of God in the problem-situations we encounter. All are brought under the activity of the community, the living tradition, as it seeks to respond to what is going on in light of the biblical vision. Practical reason is not a matter of applying one method or principle to all cases. With the response approach, the first task is to discern which combination of methods and principles is called for by a particular problem-situation.
The advantage of this approach is that it does not prematurely foreclose the methods which may be used in a community's response. "The Challenge of Peace" evidences both deductive and inductive methods. The former is most salient in the application of the principle of noncombatant immunity, which is a specification of "no direct killing of innocents" in the context of the problem-situation of war, to the case of counterpopulation bombing. 56 The principle functions to direct us to a value which requires illumination given the tendency of modern warfare to cheapen human worth. However, the principle has limited ap- Scripture, Catholic teaching, and experience to set out the basic inter pretive framework to assess the problem-situation and, in the bishops' words, "to shape our response to this moral challenge." The final sec tion, "A Call to Action," addressed primarily to the Catholic commu nity, urges a pastoral response. Lake the peace pastoral, then, descrip tion and interpretation of "what is going on" on the one hand and a call for response on the other form an inclusio around the more detailed moral and political reasoning. The bishops mention or address abortion at several points in the document, each time within the broader context of the overall response to the problem of the care of children and support for families. 60 In describing the threats to children, the bishops mention first the 1.6 million abortions per year in the U.S., but they immediately follow by highlighting poverty, infant mortality, teenage pregnancy, hunger, teenage suicide, physical and sexual abuse, and the lack of adequate education and health care. 61 Their treatment of directions for national policy follows a similar pattern. As in the treatment of noncombatant immunity in 'The Challenge of Peace," the right to life and its speci fication in the principle forbidding the direct killing of innocents serves to direct our vision to a value which requires illumination given the tendency of modern culture to cheapen human worth.
What is most noteworthy in these sections is that the enormity of the problems facing children overwhelms the distinction between the pro tection of the "right to life" and the promotion of "quality of life," that leads to the split between abortion and other issues even in Cardinal Bernardin's consistent ethic of life. In the section on national policy, the issues of abortion, abuse, neglect, and foster care all come under the rubric of "protecting the lives of children." 62 In the subsection on healthcare, the severity of the situation mutes any distinction between those problems which lead to death and those which are disabling:
The lack of basic healthcare-and factors tied directly to poverty-have been documented in the tragic reality that poor children are twice as likely as other children to have physical or mental disabilities or other chronic health condi tions that impair daily activity. Our nation's continuing failure to guarantee access to quality health care for all people exacts its most painful toll in the preventable sickness, disability and deaths of our infants and children.
63
The realities of the international situation especially overwhelm the right/quality distinction. For instance, after discussing the problem of Third-World debt, the bishops state that women and children "are the first victims of the cuts in social services made by developing countries to 'adjust' their economies to pay their burdensome debts. As we pointed out in our statement on the external debt, children are literally dying of the consequences of that debt."
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The immediate result of this qualification, and even overwhelming of the distinction between right to life and quality of life, is that the issue of the care of children gains the kind of urgency that previously was reserved for the narrower concern of abortion. The bishops identify addressing the needs of children and families as a "first priority" and an "urgent priority." 65 They state that the concern for children is the test of faith and guide for policy for Church, nation, and world. 66 The difference between this sense of urgency and that expressed for the care of children in the consistent ethic of life is that here it arises from the method itself and not simply from pastoral insight. It is a direct response to an interpretation of what is going on, unimpeded by an overdrawn distinction between the right to life and the quality of life. For this reason, it is free of the fragility that marks the consistent ethic. It is less driven by an overriding concern to make Catholic teaching on abortion acceptable to the public and less susceptible to changes in political climate. In short, it is a more stable way to relate abortion and the care of children.
Pastoral Advantages of the Responsibility Approach
I suggested at the beginning that, in addition to this overall stability in the relationship between abortion and the care of children, there are pastoral advantages with the responsibility approach in interpreting and responding to the issue of abortion itself. In light of the analysis above, several such advantages come to the fore. First, the responsibility approach, which begins with the concrete question "What is going on?" rather than with an abstract first principle, is more attentive to the moral reasoning of women who do procure abortions: they are concerned with the welfare of the child if the pregnancy should be brought to term. (A preliminary note is necessary, however, before I turn to the data. It is crucial to distinguish between recognizing the reasons women give for having abortions and claiming that those rea-64 Ibid. 396. The bishops also state, "In our hearts, we know something is wrong as we watch children die on the nightly news. We need to link those heartbreaking pictures of hunger and desperation to the structures of debt and development, conflict and violence which contribute-directly or indirectly-to the death of those children" (ibid. 404).
65 Ibid. 398, 402. 66 "We seek to measure our ministry, our nation, and our world for how we protect the lives, dignity, and rights of all God's children" (ibid. 404). Note again the absence of any protect/promote distinction; see also 395, 398. sons are morally legitimate. The evidence provided by the data on why women have abortions does not in itself constitute a moral argument one way or the other. Acknowledgment of and attentiveness to the reasons women give as to why they have abortions is fully compatible with a prohibition on directly taking the life of the fetus, as is evident in 'Tutting Children and Families First.") Data from research into why women have abortions has been slowly accumulating over the last fifteen years. 67 The most comprehensive study to date confirms previous findings. 68 The answers of the 1,900 women surveyed were complex. Ninety-three percent of the respondents gave more than one answer. The mean number of answers was four. The women were asked, however, their most important reason for having an abortion. Of the five most frequent answers, the first, second, and fifth readily fit under the more general rubric, "I could not adequately care for the child if the pregnancy were brought to term." Twenty-one percent said that they could not economically afford the child, twenty-one percent more said that they were "unready for the responsibility," and eleven percent said that they were too young or not mature enough. If this is the case, then fifty-three percent of the women cited inability to care adequately for the child as the most important reason for having their abortion.
But these are the answers to the question about their most important reason for the abortion. When asked simply to list their reasonsagain, the mean is four-thirty percent of the women indicate that they are not mature enough, thirty-one percent say they are unready for the responsibility, and sixty-eight percent indicate that they cannot economically afford the child if the pregnancy is brought to term. Since the women list more than one answer, these reasons overlap on any given questionnaire. However, even by conservative statistical estimates it is clear that at least two-thirds of the women indicate inability adequately to care for the child, particularly from an economic standpoint, among their reasons for abortion. A strictly deductive approach raises the question only indirectly, if at all. This leads to the second advantage of the responsibility approach to addressing even the issue of abortion itself. Attentiveness to the reasons women give for procuring abortions illumines what is required for any community that seeks to respond to the problem-situation. As noted above, it is crucial to distinguish between recognizing the reasons women give for having abortions and claiming that those reasons are morally legitimate. Acknowledgment of the reasons women give for having abortions is fully compatible with a negative judgment on directly taking the life of the embryo and fetus. Still, the reasons why women have abortions, particularly if they identify circumstances which are beyond their immediate control, do place a great deal of pastoral pressure on any strict prohibition against abortion. The only way to relieve that pressure without granting more latitude on taking the life of the embryo and fetus is to seek to uncover and address the forces that play a role in women having abortions. The women in the study tell us directly that the care of children is a central concern.
This leads to the third advantage of the response approach. While the data on why women have abortions highlight the differences in persons' understanding of the status of the fetus and the morality of abortion, they also illumine a point of contact between the various parties in the debate: for both women who have abortions and those who do not, abortion is an issue of the care of children. Here is a point of contact, and the best place to start in any dialogue on abortion, between persons who sharply disagree on other aspects of the question. The responsibility approach illumines for both "pro-life" and "prochoice" parties that, if their positions are not to degenerate into simply "anti-abortion" and "pro-abortion," they must place their arguments firmly in the context of the care of children.
The case for the care of children for someone who disagrees with official Catholic teaching on the status of the fetus is more complex and is worth delineating briefly. It is first of all more complex because, on such an understanding, the status of the embryo and fetus changes over the course of the pregnancy. Here, one might make almost no link between the embryo and the care of children, yet make a close connection between the fetus in the third trimester and children. In this instance, there is more in common between those who agree and disagree with official teaching as the pregnancy progresses. For someone who disagrees with official teaching, the second factor that adds complexity is the emphasis on women's choice. But even here, there is a connection to the issue of the care of children: if one seeks to enhance choice for women, then one ought to see to it that women have the wherewithal to bring a pregnancy to term and raise the child that results. Here the grounding of the case for the care of children may be different, but there is a shared obligation to children. To put it in the all-too-blunt language of the wider public debate again, if one is indeed "pro-choice," and not simply "pro-abortion," then there seems to be a positive obligation to aid women who choose to bring a pregnancy to term. One might want to weight the obligation differently than for those who agree with the official teaching, but there seems to be an obligation nonetheless.
Cooperation on such a shared sense of obligation is precisely what is going on in Missouri and Wisconsin in the movement named "common ground." 69 While both sides are clear that they will not change on their understanding of the status of the fetus-that aspect of the abortion debate is for the most part intractable-they are aware that they can jointly act from a shared judgment that abortion is tragic. This leads to the fourth advantage of the response approach. Dialogue and consensus on the care of children can lead to a decrease in the incidence of abortion. One can infer this from the data on why women have abortion. There is preliminary evidence of the truth of this point in a recent report on a St. Louis abortion clinic that also offers adoption services and counseling for women who choose to keep their newborns when the pregnancies are brought to term. The report testifies that the rate of women choosing abortion at the clinic has decreased. 70 Further efforts at instituting similar programs and further study of the results is necessary to make this point conclusive, but it merits follow-up. The point is that even these preliminary data are the result of a conscious effort at cooperation by the "common ground" movement.
Fifth, the response approach with its insistence that one place the issue of abortion in the context of the care of children contributes integrity to the Church's practice and plausibility to its witness. It is a given among feminist scholars who address abortion that one earns one's way into the debate by investing oneself in the larger, and more immediate, context of the issue. This is articulated most clearly in an article by Alison Jaggar. 71 Two principles structure her position. First, that "the right to life, when it is claimed for a human being, means the right to a full human life and to whatever means are necessary" for this. Second, that "decisions should be made by those, and only by Church's response to the care of children can be commensurate with its teaching on abortion. This is necessary if its response to either issue is to be adequate. CONCLUSION My task has been to assess the adequacy of the modes of reasoning relating abortion and the care of children in three church documents. A strictly deductive approach leaves the care of children as an indirect implication of the conclusion of a syllogism. The result is an excessive emphasis on legal prohibitions and a failure to illumine even the energy that the Catholic community is already investing in children. The consistent ethic of life, arising out of keen pastoral insight, attempts to give both issues equal standing under the rubric of "life." However wise the insight, it remains fragile because the methodological split between sexual and social ethics in official documents continues. Again, a pastoral imbalance results. Of all the options, subsuming abortion under the issue of the care of children within the context of a responsibility approach is the most stable.
Following the quote from Cardinal Bernardin at the start, I suggested that adequately relating abortion and the care of children in our moral reasoning will result in a better pastoral response to both issues. Therefore it is important to recognize that placing abortion in the context of the care of children has the potential to enhance the Catholic community's response to abortion itself. This is because the responsibility approach focuses on the reasons why women have abortions. It therefore highlights what is required of a pastoral response: the care of children. Such care can serve as a point of contact between persons who disagree in many cases on the morality of taking the life of the fetus, but who, through consensus and cooperation in the care of children, can lower the incidence of abortion. Such cooperation in the care of children would also give the Catholic Church increased credibility when it states its position on abortion in the public forum.
In the end, the responsibility approach, which places abortion in the context of the care of children, allows the official Catholic position on abortion to inform, and even set a standard for, the adequacy of its response to the care of children. The Catholic Church calls on women who are faced with pregnancy in difficult circumstances to exhibit heroism. The responsibility approach reveals that there is no intrinsic reason why this cannot be asked-indeed, required-of the rest of us.
